Introduction
If we can not talk about communism, we should speak of Eastern Europe, at least not with a capital A?? EA? Eastern Europe. Instead, we will again in Central Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe with a small?? Ea? and, most importantly, different peoples, nations and states. Timothy Garton Ash Â

The period 1989-1993 has been a roller real mountains in the history of Europe. First wave of peaceful democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a little less peaceful in Romania and Bulgaria. Then the domino secession from the former Soviet republics is â?? Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. At the last?? the division of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of a bloody ethnic war, the velvet divorce of Czechs and Slovaks, and finally?? The reunification of German republics. maximum diversity, a minimum of time?? One could say, paraphrasing Kunderaâ Milan? s famous description of Central Europe. The history had suddenly accelerated and refused to break, since the step. In 1999, joined by three newly democratized countries of NATO by seven others in 2004. Only 15 years after the story ran on the roller coaster of 10 new members of the European Union (EU) â?? Eight of them were post-communist countries. It was followed by two others in 2007. For some it is a kind of real Cinderella story. Poor, underdeveloped post-totalitarian states become full members of the most exclusive club of countries in the world?? in 15 years. A well deserved transition?? from the perspective of the neophyte.
           But what makes this process and its culmination in 2004 and 2007 are similar in terms of the older members? Was the decision to leave all these people? distant countries, which we know little?? in the interest of the 15? What was the logic behind this decision? Why did it take the accession of so long?? or perhaps why he was so suddenly? Why eastern neighbors underdeveloped are not in a form similar to quarantine instead of associate members has been invited into the exclusive club now? Why Western Europe generally make the effort? These questions seem very lively in the old Member States, especially those without a chance for a broad public debate on the â?? Idea EUROPEA ????.
           I am not able at this issue deeply enough to analyze the answers to these questions. My intention, understanding? why the 15 EU members decided to full membership of the 10 former communist countries (1) Middle East and South East Europe? This question has two possibilities that have followed a counterfactual? Why was chosen instead of full membership or associate membership in the denial of full membership.
           address this question I use two approaches leading to European integration: the intergovernmental and liberal socio-constructivism. I’ll show you how to explain the situation both in the various aspects of the â?? ????, East Enlargementâ and complement each other. I will also show why the expansion was a good idea (as opposed to some of the votes in 15 states), to speak in a rational and prescriptive.
           I was the first introduction of these two theoretical approaches, before I give the results in the relocation process to the eastward expansion. / Intergovernmentalism>

       Liberal: The value> added / a> />

liberal version of scientific rigor intergovernmentalism by Andrew Moravcsik developed to analyze the â? important steps towards the European integrationist? (Cited in: Schimmelfennig 2005: 75). The approach is based on instrumental rationality supposed actors (states, government delegations in the negotiations), who act according to their preferences (exogenous, the negotiating process established in the political struggle in office) and try their targets are still haunted by the actions of other rational state (2) restricted.
           The accession of 12 new members is certainly a â?? Stepa ????, Great One would expect LI good fit to explain. This case is however said to be a very problematic? â?? TA provides a partial explanation for the enlargement of the EEA, as ????, Frank Schimmelfennig claims (Ibid: 75, 86-92).  He then gives a fair account of opportunities LI is able to explain how the events. His main argument is that LI plausible enough to answer the question of why a full member, but a form of association in the post-Communist states do not offer as early as 1993 (ibid: 90). Schimmelfennigâ Â? The answer to this problem, the role of values is actorsâ in design? Preferences, and there is the question? s more important is the strengthening or weakening of their bargaining power (I will return in the next section).
           There are two arguments in favor of the TA and cons Schimmelfennigâ? point S. First person?? the logic of it? Association membership required? based on the underlying assumption that more or less explicit was the expansion of small short-term benefits for former 15th He was described as an act of good will or charity in the name of a tributary of the Western Europe. I want to prove that this is not true?? at least not for all the older EU members. By allowing the detection of instrumental rationality behind the decision eastern neighbors to participate fully in the European project, we leave the enlargement process in the ERC? S domain of the application or just one?? Turfan Home? (Caporaso, Checkel and Jupille 2003). The second argument is that if we treat the ideal range, as a factor actorsâ? Interest in education, we can create interest therefore in a purely liberal intergovernmental (which also Moravcsik? Item S of the critique of the value added tax of constructivism. Checkel and Moravcsik 2001 Comparison).
           I will show that there are two ways in which 15 former countries have benefited directly from the A-EEC membership.

       Social Constructivism: The required value> / P>
The constructivist approach ( 3), is an example of Schimmelfennigâ?? s above-cited paper, in its milder forms, which are presented here, focuses on the role of social interaction in the process of Europeanization (Checkel 1999; Moravcsik and Checkel 2001: 220). In the various processes of argumentation and negotiation are the actor said in an exchange thicker and deeper ideas that will lead them to reformulate their preferences and to examine their interests to get involved. The socialization process that changes within the supra-national institutions and the Intergovernmental Conference on the possibilities of European actors define themselves (identity), the goals they seek and the means to achieve them. “/ P>
           To put it concretely, in the case of Eastern enlargement, the key question that must be addressed is the statesâ post-communist? ?? â?? Outer Economica? Quality of bargaining power. The 10 countries seemed to offer little in return for a subscription (which would be of great use for them). I want this kind of thinking always challenging, but in any case the problem is clear. Schimmelfennigâ? response S is formation of a community that adherence to certain values that the post-communist states are used to gain power in negotiations (2001). I would like to discuss the plausibility of explanations constructivist and compare them with the IGC.

         closest to
From the point of view of the TA to consider the extension should be a rational choice of 15 former governments (and societies to some extent one?? national training preferred). The declaration of interests of the candidates had the opportunity, is simple, less thatâ? S, which appears to defeat the literature. These are short-term interests of current members, which is puzzling. In fact, I think, is not completely true. As already mentioned, the interests of 15 alumni are twofold.
            In terms of safety, short-term benefits are obvious, the majority (in fact Schimmelfennig calls them like? Interestsâ? Geopolitics ? [2005: 89]). The littoral states with the new democracies of Central Europe (Germany) were most interested in joining one? seen both as a means of disciplining fast and long-term stabilization of the region. Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) goes so far as to say that the EU an instrument?? Collective hegemonyâ ????, used to increase the safety of members of the collective direct and indirect pressure to stabilize. This can explain very well, the old 15-inch color? S a privileged partnership rapid newborn democracies and give them a clear signal that the possibility of accession. A signal from the first wave followed, then more and more strict criteria.
           In economic terms, the short-term gains are far less obvious. It is true that through the EEA? S structural support, huge sums of money have been moved to the east. In contrast, the increase had on the markets of the EEC did not matter, at least at the time of the Copenhagen criteria. After accession, but we’ve seen a lot of short-term benefits for the old member states. The unexpected result (4) An enlargement of the East and the liberalization of the labor market is the migration from the enormous new member states to 12 brave enough to open their markets immediately. Great Britain and Ireland were invaded by immigrant workers, but also Greece, Portugal and Spain, the wave of their reach. And the results were (are)?? surprisingly positive. Ireland? S boom was hungry for cheap labor. The mythical figure of â?? Polish plumber? where jobs and benefits of Western society has proven to be a complete misunderstanding. How to watch the British and Irish governments (Travis 2007, Seaver 2007) CEE immigrants turned out that not only hard workers but consumers, promotion of local markets. What? In addition, and an intersection of security and economic issues, there is strong emphasis on socio-cultural aspects of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. New immigrants are temporary economic, work-based and culturally compatible with Western societies. This means that solving most immigrants have no intention in the host country (the host for her and Socialist-S) to exploit labor income, prefer the often intense, plus allowances unemployment and absorbed much less problems. This last factor is particularly important now that many Western companies have difficulties in their Muslim immigrant groups, a nest of Islamic fundamentalism (5) to assimilate. “/ P>
           In summary, a?? This suggests that it may be a plausible explanation for the eastward expansion of the TA. The 15 old Member States have a strong economic and security interests in the accession of post-communist states?? Short-term and long term. In my opinion, a full member is more a symbolic issue, but also in concrete?? bargaining could not take place if the countries of the EEC, a simple membership associates were offered. Economic costs (structural funds to help), the CEECs would remain the same. Not them in the decision, it would be difficult for any broad social consensus. What? A S more? vision of the accession on the horizon was a big motivation for reforms in the region (Judt 1998: 102). If this goal is unclear, however, far in time, it was the stability of the economy and communities can, after more or Yugoslav scenario developed in Belarus.
           It seems that no real problems LI explain the fact, the expansion, though I still believe other theories can help us to understand its shape and speed. Even if he had the 15 original significant interests in the East, these are only some among many of his interests. Why are they more important than the Western elites and corporations with such interpretations of the facts that made the eastward expansion provided seems necessary, and why did CEECs economically vulnerable to such a situation strong position in the negotiations that resulted (Copenhagen Nice to win)? constructivist analysis have to say something.      Â
           In short, the EU is a community share common values a?? liberal and democratic. It was explicitly based on the federalist vision of a united Europe, the European Union cultural heritage, moral and ideological. After Schimmelfennig (2001: 63), if members of a community expectation that the objectives are pursued in accordance with the common ethos, legitimized and empowered by the common values. In his account of constructivist traditional values are simply there, set up by an old 15?? Driversâ? the process of a shame?? brakemenâ? to accept full membership in the post-communist countries. Iver B. Neumann? S (1999) interpretive analysis of a different starting point is one?? He suggested that the elites of Central Europe have developed their own discourse community is to show: they are responsible as part of the West (Judt 1998:42), the European heritage to which they and Central European identity , which allowed the countries of the region work together towards a peaceful settlement, â?? Civilised? Way. In a way, trying to teach the intellectuals of Central Europe Western Europe was the European (Kundera 1984, 2001), and the number of similarities EC countries with their richer neighbors EC. Everything a hint of bitterness, a bore? EC some circles, reminds the public that Western Europe has been responsible for historical misfortune of Central Europe. The two words?? Munich ????, Treason â?? September 1939a ????, â?? Yaltaâ? â and?? Plana Marshall? were often (used Pà ³ k in 2006).
           When the â?? Central European Discourse? Visegrad countries been successful vis a visa for the EC / EU one, other, less obvious?? Central Europeana?? In geographical terms, they began to use it, so imagine the region extending from the letter?? Trieste on the Adriatic? At that time, Tallinn on the Baltic coast, and also in Sofia on the Black Sea (Neumann, 1999). A
           This demonstrates the important role that the reference to a?? Identityâ European? played in the negotiations. I think that mere association (as a goal, not as a pre-accession) is simply not an option, nor the denial of integration. Besides the obvious material interests of former had 15 in the expansion, it could simply no legitimate explanation for withdrawal of EEC countries. The Copenhagen criteria, an explicit statement of requirements for the candidates were forced to the EU by individuals such as the legendary Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. If the EU refuses to allow new countries into one?? it would lose its legitimacy and image of a benign community of liberal democracies. In return, he would turn, morally, an exclusive club, self-service beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan, forget what they owe the rest of the continent and the United States elsewhere.

        Summary: The bases and gaps in My goal was to use the intergovernmental liberal and social constructivism to explain how EU enlargement has been done, and why is it the way it has developed. I believe that IPM learn more about how we have to say think. It is not only able to complete the negotiations due to the candidate? S Page (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002), but as I tried to show he can be a plausible explanation of 15 former preferences and decisions.
           LI may explain why full members were selected through a form of union. Constructivism, on the other side to show why the full membership of the only viable option available to members of the EU was, in each case. I believe that the path used references to the CEEC â?? Identityâ European? and how this discourse has been taken over by the â? driversâ? integration between the old 15, is a very useful overview.
           On the whole one?? Constructivism, although it seems interesting, a smaller value in the state of the case, as its proponents believe. It turns out that much more can be found explained in part rational, while constructivism adds a touch of Weber’s understanding of the Declaration reationalist Declaration.
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References
Caporaso, James Checkel jeffreyi and Jupille Joseph (2003) â?? Â Â Â Â Â Â Â integration institutions: rationalism, constructivism and the study of EU-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â IntroductionA ????, Comparative Political Studies 36 (February-March ): 70-40.
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first is: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. The A?? -10? refers to all post-communist newcomers, not the 10 states that the European Union on May 1 are attached. 2004th Malta and Cyprus are excluded from the analysis.
2 This is only a cursory summary of Moravcsik? Theory, but should suffice for the purpose of my work. For a detailed account, see LI: Moravcsik 1998th
3 As indicated in Section intergovernmentalism abortion liberal, I choose not too deeply into the details of meta-theory of social constructivism that scope of this article is not big enough and it is not very relevant to the argument.
4 Schimmelfennig (2001, 2005) speaks only of trade and investment when he mentioned the economic interest. This leads him to conclude that EAEC? S adjacent States should be more interested in expanding as more distant countries. Therefore it is unable to explain the case of the United Kingdom (the argument of conservatives?? Europhobiaâ? [Schimmelfennig 2001: 53] is fairly low) â?? not a neighbor and close to the proclamation of the European idea. Taking into account the liberalization of Britains work?? S position is to manage very easily.
5 Â Unlike most scholars writing on the subject, I recommend the negative impact on the new 12 (emigration). This is the very high migration, the flight of skilled workers and mobile in the country where the purchase of items they are often more skilled. This reduces the rate of open unemployment in CEE countries, reducing the workforce and prevent students from each membership of a labor market in their country of origin. a decline in unemployment will lead to termination of a long-term measures against the structural causes of unemployment?? a bomb socio-economic. The sociological and psychological negative effects of high emigration are also difficult to ignore. A